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Abstract: Given the direct influence of socioeconomic diversity in schools on 
student achievement, it is important to try to understand the causes of rising 
income segregation across schools. My paper assesses whether school attendance 
zone gerrymandering contributes to income segregation across public schools 
within 129 of the largest school districts in the United States. I compare income 
segregation levels between actual school attendance zones and hypothetical school 
attendance zones that would exist in the absence of gerrymandering to determine if 
current zone shapes contribute to segregation. I also test for correlations between 
income diversity within school attendance zones and the shapes of attendance 
zones as quantified by spatial compactness measures commonly found in the 
political gerrymandering literature. I find that on average, irregularly-shaped, 
gerrymandered school attendance zones seem to better integrate, rather than further 
segregate students of different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
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Introduction  
Starting with the Coleman Report of 1966, research has consistently shown that concentrated 
poverty in schools has a negative effect on student performance. The Coleman report famously 
found that “socioeconomic factors bear a strong relation to academic achievement” and that “a 
pupil's achievement is strongly related to the educational backgrounds and aspirations of the 
other students in the school” (Coleman 1966, 21-22). An analysis of fourth grade National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) math test scores found that low-income students in 
middle-class schools outperformed middle-class students in high-poverty schools (Kahlenberg 
2002, 4). Children living in Montgomery County, Maryland public housing projects that were 
randomly assigned to low-poverty schools had positive, statistically significant improvements in 
test scores compared to a control group of students in public housing who were assigned to high-
poverty schools (Schwartz 2010). These studies and others like them demonstrate that an 
important component of improving academic performance among low-income students is to 
provide them with access to high quality, low-poverty, socioeconomically integrated schools.  
Existing research has shown that concentrated poverty in schools has such a dramatic effect 
on student achievement because of factors like lower teacher quality, lower rates of parental 
involvement, and peer effects. In high-poverty schools, 21.5 percent of core classes are taught by 
a teacher with neither a certification nor a college major in the subject area taught, while only 
10.9 percent of low-poverty core classes face this problem (Almy and Theokas 2010).  High-
poverty schools have consistently higher variation in teacher effectiveness than low-poverty 
schools, and this is because “the least effective teachers in high-poverty schools are much less 
effective than their counterparts in lower-poverty schools” (Sass et. al, 2010, 19). In terms of 
parental involvement, parents who take a more active role in their child's education tend to have 
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children with better reading and mathematics achievement as well as higher motivation to 
succeed in school (McWayne et. al, 371). However, socioeconomic status is the “primary 
predictor” of parent involvement in schools, and parent involvement in high-poverty schools is 
generally “abysmally low.” (Kahlenberg 2003, 62). Lastly, since high-poverty schools tend to 
have a higher share of low-performing students, the salience of peer effects shows that the 
academic performance of individual students is directly influenced by the performance of their 
peers (Borg, Borg and Stranahan 2012, 2; Gottfried 2014) The mean ability of a class in terms of 
reading and math performance in previous years is positively and statistically significantly 
related to student performance on individual tests, which suggests that students can be influenced 
by the aptitude and motivation levels of their peers (Gottfried 2014). If this is true, students in 
high-poverty, low-achieving classrooms are more likely to be low-performing individuals 
themselves in part because of the negative consequences of peer effects.  
Despite the well-documented negative consequences of concentrated poverty in schools, 
income segregation across schools has increased in recent years. From 1990-2010, income 
segregation across school districts increased by over 15 percent, and income segregation across 
schools within school districts also increased by over 40 percent (Owens and Jencks 2016, 1159). 
Accordingly, the share of public school students attending high-poverty schools has increased 
from 12 percent in 1999 to 19 percent in 2011 (Snyder and Dillow 2013, 190). Because 
socioeconomic diversity in schools is so tied to student performance, it is important to try to 
understand the causes of school income segregation. This thesis does so by examining the 
following research question: To what extent does gerrymandering of school attendance zones 
contribute to income segregation within school districts? It is particularly important to evaluate 
the causes of segregation within school districts rather than between school districts following 
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the 1974 Supreme Court case Milliken v. Bradley. In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court ruled that 
federal courts do not have the authority to impose multi-district school desegregation plans that 
would create less segregated schools in compliance with Brown v. Board of Education (Hertz 
2014). The Court’s emphasis on local control of education in the Milliken decision has 
essentially made it impossible to implement desegregation plans across school districts, and so 
redrawing attendance zones within individual school districts is one of the last tools 
policymakers can legally use to create more socioeconomically and racially integrated schools.  
Theoretical Framework and General Hypothesis  
The term “gerrymandering” originated in the early 19th century, when the Governor of 
Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry, redrew such distorted, misshapen boundaries for a state senate 
district that the district’s new shape was compared to a “salamander” and the district itself was 
referred to as a “Gerry-mander” (Trickey 2017). While this state senate district from 1812 was 
not the first politically manipulated district in U.S. history, it was the first district to coin the term 
“gerrymandering,” wherein legislative districts are irregularly drawn with the intention of giving 
a particular politician or political party an advantage during elections. Some scholars argue that 
just as legislatures can gerrymander the borders of legislative districts during the redistricting 
process, school districts have similar opportunities to gerrymander the attendance zones of public 
schools in order to adjust the racial and socioeconomic compositions of schools.  
There are two competing theories about whether school attendance zones are gerrymandered 
to increase school segregation. Richards’ (2014) theory of “student exchange,” which rests on 
the concept of NIMBYism, argues that school attendance zone gerrymandering increases 
segregation in schools. However, Saporito’s (2017) application of Tobler’s First Law as applied 
to segregation across schools suggests that compact school attendance zones should be more 
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segregated than irregularly shaped zones, and that gerrymandering should therefore reduce 
segregation in schools. Saporito’s and Richards’ theoretical and empirical disagreements hold 
constant across multiple papers (Richards 2014; Richards and Stroub 2015; Saporito and Van 
Riper 2016; Saporito 2017).  The following paragraphs review this debate. 
In her paper on racial segregation across school attendance zones, Richards (2014, 1125) 
cites the concept of “voter exchange through electoral gerrymandering,” where the boundaries of 
legislative districts are manipulated to create a population of voters that is more demographically 
advantageous to politicians by excluding some nearby voters and replacing them with voters that 
live further away. This means that politicians tasked with drawing electoral boundaries are 
effectively choosing their own voters when they gerrymander legislative districts. Richards 
(2014, 1125) then applies this concept of “voter exchange” to school attendance zones and 
generates a theory of “student exchange,” where school districts draw attendance zones to “zone 
in” certain students to certain schools and “zone out” others in a way that segregates ethnic/racial 
minority students. Therefore, Richards’ (2014) theory of student exchange asserts that many 
school attendance zones are gerrymandered to segregate students by race within school districts, 
and she argues that her empirical research supports this theory.  It thus follows that when applied 
to income segregation, this theory would predict that school attendance zones are gerrymandered 
to zone in wealthy students to low-poverty schools and zone out poor students from those same 
schools.  
 “Student exchange” theory is consistent with the theory of NIMBYism. NIMBY stands for 
“Not In My Backyard,” and it refers, in the context of housing development, to the opposition 
that new construction of multifamily homes (which generally serve low-income people) faces in 
affluent areas. Some of the main arguments used by NIMBY-proponents are that low-income 
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apartments will inevitably put a financial burden on school districts and drive down property 
values by bringing crime into their privileged communities (Obrinsky and Stein 2007, 4). Since 
the theory of NIMBYism suggests that people do not want low-income apartments in their 
housing markets because of their stereotypes about low-income people, it follows that these same 
people could want to prevent low-income students from attending high-achieving, low-poverty 
schools. Parents who choose to pay high property taxes in order to live in neighborhoods with 
excellent schools may view access to those schools as a zero-sum game and will thus be more 
likely to oppose bold socioeconomic integration efforts like student transfer initiatives or new 
enrollment policies (Rotherham 2010).  
To test her theory, Richards (2014) constructs hypothetical attendance zones that would exist 
in the absence of gerrymandering, and then she compares the racial segregation levels in school 
districts produced by the hypothetical zones and actual school attendance zones. Richards (2014) 
constructs these hypothetical school attendance zones by using Thiessen polygons. A Thiessen 
polygon is a polygon built around one point such that the area enclosed in the polygon’s 
boundaries is closest to that point relative to all other points. This would mean that hypothetical 
attendance zones would be drawn such that the entire area enclosed in one school’s zone is 
closest to that school rather than any other school. Richards believes these Thiessen polygon 
attendance zones show what school attendance zones would look like in the absence of 
gerrymandering, because they are completely convex and optimally efficient (Richards 2014, 
1128).  To illustrate what Thiessen polygon attendance zones would look like, Figure 1 compares 
the actual attendance zones of New York City Public Schools to the hypothetical attendance 
zones for that district drawn using the Thiessen polygon method. The red borders represent the 
actual zones while the green borders represent the hypothetical zones. Richards conceptualizes 
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the Thiessen zones as perfectly non-gerrymandered because they lack any odd indentations or 
irregularities aside from those used to conform to the borders of the school district at large.  
Figure 1. Actual (red) and hypothetical (green) attendance zones for New York City Public 
Schools. 
 
Richards finds that “racial segregation among actual attendance zones is significantly higher 
than the segregation among Thiessen attendance zones,” with actual attendance zones 
segregating black and white students 0.002 percentage points more than the hypothetical zones 
(Richards 2014, 1141). She believes this demonstrates that actual attendance zones deviate from 
hypothetical, non-gerrymandered zones to segregate students by race within school districts. She 
also finds that while the differences in segregation levels among actual and hypothetical 
attendance zones were higher in areas experiencing rapid racial change, there was no relationship 
between segregation level differences and rapid socioeconomic change (Richards 2014, 1148). 
This would suggest on the surface that her theory of segregative attendance zone gerrymandering 
would only apply to racial, rather than income segregation. However, Richards (2014, 1148) 
admits that the measure of poverty she used, free-and-reduced-price lunch status, “is generally 
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considered a poor measure of socioeconomic status,” so this suggests that more research on 
income segregation is needed using higher-quality measures of income.   
Several specific cases support Richards’ (2014) theory that school attendance zone 
gerrymandering increases segregation in schools. In her own paper, she shows a map visualizing 
one of the school attendance zones that she analyzed, and she uses the map to demonstrate that 
Hispanic and black census blocks were zoned out of attending a particular school with razor 
sharp precision (Richards 2014, 1139). There are also local news articles that support Richards’ 
theory that gerrymandered attendance zone shapes contribute to school segregation. For instance, 
reporting from Dallas about an attendance zone for the Mata School argues that the zone is 
irregularly shaped to zone in black and Latino families and zone out white families, which shows 
that gerrymandering resulted in segregated schools in that specific case (Robberson 2012; 
Saporito and Van Riper 2016). Additionally, Siegel-Hawley’s (2013, 580) account of Henrico 
County Public School’s rezoning process shows that the district’s new attendance zones 
“solidified extreme patterns of racial isolation within high school attendance areas” (Siegel-
Hawley 2013, 605). Under the new zones, 17 percent of the County’s black high school aged 
students were zoned into a highly segregated school, compared to 0 percent of black students 
under the previous zones (Siegel-Hawley 2013, 605). All these examples demonstrate that there 
is already some documented evidence supporting Richards’ theory of “student exchange” and 
subsequent segregative attendance zone gerrymandering.  
Meanwhile, in his paper on income segregation across school attendance zones, Saporito 
(2017, 5) cites Tobler’s First Law of geography, which states “nearby things are more similar 
than distant things.” When applied to the distribution of income groups within neighborhoods, 
Tobler’s Law suggests that “the income of a householder is more similar to his or her closest 
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neighbors than the income of his or her neighbors down the street,” and that “the income 
composition of two adjacent city blocks is likely more similar than the income composition of 
two city blocks located farther apart” (Saporito 2017, 5). Consequently, Saporito theorizes that 
because people who reside near each other are more likely to share socioeconomic 
characteristics, compact zones will be more segregated than gerrymandered zones by reinforcing 
existing patterns of neighborhood income segregation. By “breaking up” socioeconomically 
homogenous neighborhoods into different school attendance zones, drawing irregularly shaped 
zones through zone gerrymandering could therefore serve as a positive tool for economic 
integration.  
The dramatic increase of residential segregation by income in recent decades supports 
Saporito’s theory. In 1980, 23 percent of low-income households lived in majority low-income 
census tracts, but by 2010, that share had climbed to 28 percent (Fry and Taylor 2012). Even 
more dramatically, only 9 percent of upper-income households lived in majority upper-income 
census tracts in 1980, but that share increased to 18 percent by 2010 (Fry and Taylor 2012). This 
means that by 2012, over one-third (34 percent) of all families lived in neighborhoods with 
median incomes significantly above or significantly below the median income of their 
metropolitan area (Reardon and Bischoff 2016). Overall family income segregation across 
neighborhoods within major metropolitan areas increased by approximately 27 percent between 
1970 and 2012 (Reardon and Bischoff 2016). If people increasingly cluster into specific 
neighborhoods based on socioeconomic similarity, then Saporito’s theory that compact, “less 
gerrymandered” school attendance zones will only serve to reinforce residential inequalities 
clearly makes logical sense. Saporito’s theory is backed up to a degree even by Richards (2014, 
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1125), who concedes in her analysis that in some cases, gerrymandering has the potential to be 
“affirmative, zoning out more […] similar students in favor of more dissimilar students.” 
Saporito’s (2017) methodology differs from Richards’ methodology in several key ways. 
First, while the main statistical tools Richards (2014) uses are ttests to test for statistically 
significant segregation differences between actual and hypothetical attendance zones, Saporito 
(2017) constructs several regression models to test his theory. He regresses a measure of income 
segregation across school attendance zones on two measures of residential income segregation 
and two measures of school attendance zone shape. Using a regression model allows Saporito 
(2017) to explicitly control for other factors in his analysis, most importantly residential 
segregation, to parse out the individual effect of attendance zone shape / gerrymandering on 
income segregation across schools. Another difference between their methodologies is that while 
Saporito (2017) also uses Thiessen polygons in his analysis, Saporito (2017) does not agree with 
Richards that Thiessen polygons represent hypothetical, perfectly compact attendance zones that 
would exist in the absence of segregation. This is because Thiessen polygons do not necessarily 
produce attendance zones that are equally or even similarly populated, so they cannot in all cases 
be ideal or even realistic school attendance zones for districts to adopt. Saporito (2017) instead 
conceptualizes Thiessen polygons as neighborhood units within school districts, and he argues 
that district-level segregation measures calculated using Thiessen polygons are representative of 
residential segregation levels within school districts. Therefore, Saporito (2017) uses Thiessen 
polygons to calculate one of his two measures of residential segregation that he incorporates into 
his regression model as independent variables.   
Yet another way that Saporito’s (2017) work differs from Richards’ (2014) work is that he 
quantifies the shapes of school attendance zones using spatial compactness measures found in 
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the political gerrymandering literature. In the gerrymandering literature, the mathematical 
definition of compactness is the extent to which a legislative district’s shape “deviates from 
perfect circularity,” but in layman’s terms, compactness refers to the extent to which shapes 
appear “irregular,” “bizarre,” or “ugly” (Richards and Stroub 2015, 7). Saporito’s (2017) two 
measures of compactness used in this paper – a concavity (CV) index and Convex Hull (CH) 
index - range from 0 to 1, with scores closer to 0 indicating attendance zone shapes that are 
perfectly compact and scores closer to 1 indicating zone shapes that are highly irregular 
(Saporito 2017, 1354). These indices are the measures of attendance zone shape that are 
incorporated into Saporito’s (2017) regression models; Saporito (2017) uses the mean CV and 
CH scores of all the attendance zones in a school district to capture the effect of attendance zone 
shape on school income segregation across schools within school districts.  
Saporito’s (2017) regression results demonstrate that residential segregation “almost 
completely accounts for income segregation across schools,” and that the regression coefficients 
associated with both measures of school attendance zone shape are negative. This demonstrates 
that “irregularly shaped attendance zones are associated with lower levels of income segregation 
across attendance zones” within school districts (Saporito 2017, 1359). He also finds that the 
school districts with lower levels of school income segregation than expected given their higher 
measures of residential segregation oftentimes have attendance zones that are highly irregular in 
shape (Saporito 2017, 1364). Saporito rules out that shape irregularities in those school districts 
are accidental or coincidental, because he shows that none of those bizarrely shaped zones result 
from proximity to topographic features like rivers, lakes, and mountains (Saporito 2017, 1365). 
All this evidence contributes to Saporito’s (2017) argument that school attendance zone 
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gerrymandering, as defined by zone shape irregularity, is associated more with school integration 
rather than school segregation.  
Other authors have engaged this debate over school attendance zone gerrymandering as well. 
Monarrez’s (2018) recent work on racial segregation and school attendance zones is consistent 
with Saporito’s (2017) theory and methodology. Monarrez (2018, 12) states in his paper that 
“districts can achieve more racial integration in schools by increasing the amount of distance 
students travel to school,” and that “if residences are racially segregated, a ‘neighborhood 
schools’ assignment system will result in a racially segregated school system.” He defines 
desegregation policy as officials working to create school attendance zones which are more 
integrated than neighborhood-based schools and he also uses Theissen polygons to show what 
attendance zones would look like under a strict neighborhood schools approach (Monarrez 2018, 
16). In his paper, Monarrez (2018) echoes Saporito’s (2017) conceptualization of school 
attendance zone gerrymandering, wherein irregular boundaries that deviate from perfectly 
compact Theissen polygon zones are more likely to integrate rather than segregate schools.  
Some might argue that Richards and Saporito’s diverging theories are the result of writing 
about different forms of segregation, for Saporito’s (2017) paper focuses on income segregation 
while Richards’ (2014) paper focuses on racial segregation. However, even when Saporito writes 
another paper focusing on racial segregation, his theoretical framework and empirical results still 
contradict those of Richards (Saporito and Van Riper 2016). In this paper, Saporito and Van 
Riper (2016) also use compactness measures common in the political gerrymandering literature 
to quantify the extent to which attendance zones are irregularly shaped. They find “modest, 
positive correlations between attendance zone irregularity and absolute racial diversity” and that 
almost all the most bizarrely shaped zones are also the most racially diverse. Additionally, they 
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find positive correlations between attendance zone irregularity and spatially distinct clustering of 
different racial groups. This evidence that irregularly shaped, gerrymandered attendance zones 
are more likely to produce racially integrated schools shows that Saporito’s theories hold even 
when applied to the issue of racial segregation.  
In a follow-up paper from Richards on racial segregation, where she relies on compactness 
measures similar to those used by Saporito, Richards argues that that her empirical findings 
support her theory rather than Saporito’s (Richards and Stroub 2015). Richards and Stroub 
(2015, 20) find that shape irregularity as quantified by compactness measures is “positively 
related to the proportion of whites in a school” and “negatively related to the proportion of 
students qualifying for free-and-reduced-price lunch.” They also find that school districts facing 
higher rates of racial/ethnic demographic change are more likely to have higher levels of 
attendance zone gerrymandering across schools in the district (Richards and Stroub 2015, 21). 
Interestingly, they find that more segregated school districts generally have less gerrymandered 
attendance zones. They concede that this evidence could be used to support the argument that 
irregularly shaped attendance zones can be used affirmatively to create more integrated districts. 
However, they argue that when coupled with her findings on demographic change, it is more 
likely that gerrymandering is primarily employed as a tool to subvert higher levels of residential 
integration” (Richards and Stroub 2015, 22). By this, they mean districts that are already 
residentially segregated do not need to use gerrymandering to segregate students by race, and it 
is only in districts with more residential integration that gerrymandering is necessary to racially 
segregate schools. They argue that this would explain why districts with more gerrymandered 
boundaries tend to have lower levels of racial segregation across schools.  
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Both Richards and Saporito present persuasive evidence to support their theories and have 
well-documented methodologies and results, but Saporito’s theory and findings are ultimately 
more persuasive. Richards’ sweeping conclusions that “first grade attendance zone boundaries 
generally serve to segregate students by race and ethnicity” and that attendance zone 
gerrymandering is “primarily a means of excluding non-white and poor students from whiter and 
more affluent schools” are not satisfactorily borne out by the evidence she presents (Richards 
2014, 1119; Richards and Stroub 2015, 1). The segregation differences that Richards (2014) 
finds between actual and hypothetical attendance zones are statistically significant, but it is hard 
to believe that 0.001-0.006 percentage point differences are substantively significant.  
Furthermore, Richards and Stroub’s (2015, 22) finding that school districts with more 
gerrymandered attendance zones tend to be “substantially” less segregated clearly seems to 
support Saporito’s argument that irregularly shaped zones reduce segregation, and Richards and 
Stroub even admit that a possible interpretation of their results involves integrative, “affirmative” 
gerrymandering.  The disconnect between Richards’ far-reaching conclusions and her actual 
evidence appears problematic. Therefore, my general hypothesis is that irregularly shaped, 
gerrymandered attendance zones are more likely to reduce rather than increase segregation, in 
accordance with Saporito’s theory and empirical findings.  
Research Methods & Data: Part I  
 My research methodology consists of two parts. In the first part of my analysis, I apply 
the methods from Richards’ (2014) work on racial segregation to the topic of income 
segregation. I construct Thiessen polygons around the schools in my sample to demonstrate what 
hypothetical attendance zones would look like in the absence of gerrymandering. I then calculate 
income segregation levels for each school district produced by the actual attendance zones and 
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the Thiessen attendance zones. Finally, I run a dependent ttest to test for statistically significant 
differences in the segregation levels generated by actual and hypothetical attendance zones for 
each school district. If actual school attendance zones produce statistically significantly higher 
levels of segregation on average than hypothetical attendance zones, that would suggest that 
Richards’s theory is right and that actual attendance zones are gerrymandered to segregate 
students by income. If hypothetical school attendance zones have statistically significantly higher 
levels of segregation on average than actual attendance zones, that would suggest that Saporito’s 
theory is right and that compact, “non-gerrymandered” zones contribute more to segregation by 
reinforcing residential segregation patterns. An important caveat is that quantitative analyses  
cannot parse out discriminatory intent, but my findings can still demonstrate whether attendance 
zone gerrymandering is consistent with what either Saporito’s or Richards’ theory would predict.  
I measure income segregation across schools by using a dissimilarity index calculation 
that is modified to be an ordinal segregation measure. A simple dissimilarity index measures the 
extent to which the proportions of two different groups within sub-areal units match the 
proportions of two different groups present in a larger areal unit (Whitehurst, Reeves, and 
Rodrigue 2016). For example, in the context of school income segregation, a simple dissimilarity 
index could show the extent to which the proportions of poor people in each attendance zone 
mirror the proportion of poor people living in the entire school district. This measure ranges from 
0 to 1, and the value of the simple dissimilarity index represents the proportion of people that 
would need to move into different attendance zones to make the income demographics of the 
zones match the income demographics of the district at large (Ibid). For example, a school 
district’s dissimilarity index score of 0.4 would mean that 40 percent of the district’s population 
would have to change attendance zones so that the proportions of poor populations in the zones 
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would match the proportion of the entire district. The dissimilarity index is therefore a measure 
of how evenly the population of interest is distributed across the sub-areas within a larger area.  
For my analysis, it is necessary to adjust the simple dissimilarity index because my 
income variable, household income in the past 12 months, consists of 16 income brackets rather 
than just 2 categories. Additionally, household income is an ordinal variable because there is an 
inherent order to the ranges of each income bracket, and the simple dissimilarity index is 
calculated assuming that the two groups involved are unordered. To create a more appropriate 
segregation measure for my chosen income variable, I modify the simple dissimilarity index 
calculation using Reardon and Firebaugh’s (2008) ordinal segregation approach. For each school 
attendance zone and each school district, I calculate the proportion of all households earning at 
or below the lowest income bracket (Less than $10,000), the number of households earning at or 
below the lowest and second-lowest income bracket (Less than $10,000 and $10,000-$14,999), 
and so on iteratively with the last proportion being the proportion of all households earning at or 
below the lowest 15 income brackets. These proportions generate a total of 15 different income 
groups. Next, using the calculations outlined in Figure 2, I calculate dissimilarity between the 
first income group and all income groups above it, the second income group and all income 
groups above it, and so on until 15 dissimilarity scores are produced for each school district. The 
final dissimilarity index, and therefore the final segregation score, for each school district is the 
average of these 15 dissimilarity scores. Each school district has two dissimilarity indices and 
therefore two segregation scores calculated in this manner – one from the distribution of the 16 
income groups across actual attendance zones within school districts, and the second from the 
distribution of the 16 income groups across the hypothetical attendance zones (based on Thiessen 
polygons) within school districts. The actual value of the modified dissimilarity index does not 
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have a clear interpretation like the simple dissimilarity index does, but lower values of the 
modified dissimilarity index indicate lower levels of segregation while higher values of the index 
indicate higher levels of segregation.  
Figure 2. Dissimilarity Index Calculation.  
Once segregation levels are calculated for each school district based on both the actual 
and hypothetical attendance zones, I use a dependent ttest to determine if the difference in mean 
segregation levels produced by actual and hypothetical zones is statistically significantly 
different from zero. A dependent ttest rather than in independent ttest is used because the same 
sample of observation units, in this case the 129 school districts chosen for analysis, are used to 
generate both the segregation levels produced by the actual attendance zones and segregation 
levels produced by the hypothetical attendance zones (Laerd Statistics 2013). Additionally, I test 
whether the assumptions underlying the dependent ttest are met. I test if the differences between 
the actual and hypothetical zones’ segregation levels are normally distributed using a qnorm plot 
and Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality (Ibid). I also test for any outliers among the 
differences between actual and hypothetical zones’ segregation levels using a box plot.  
𝐷𝑗 =  
∑ [𝑡𝑖|𝑝𝑖 − 𝑃|]
𝑛
𝑖=1
2𝑇𝑃(1 − 𝑃)
 
𝐷𝑗 = Dissimilarity calculation for each school district, j  
𝑡𝑖 = The total population of each attendance zone, i 
T = The total population of each school district, j 
𝑝𝑖 = The ratio of an income group’s population in each attendance zone to the 
total population of each attendance zone  
P = The ratio of an income group’s population in each school district to the total 
population of each school district   
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My analysis is focused solely on school attendance boundaries that apply to first graders. 
Broadly, I choose elementary school attendance boundaries because middle school and high 
school attendance boundaries are oftentimes so large that their borders are very similar to the 
borders of the entire school district, and so for those schools there would not necessarily be 
sufficient numbers of attendance zones within every district to conduct the analysis (Saporito 
2016). I choose first grade specifically because “districts have different attendance zones for 
different grade levels,” and so it is necessary to choose one grade for consistency (Richards 
2014). Additionally, both Saporito (2016, 2017) and Richards (2014) use first grade attendance 
zones in their analysis, and I want my work to be as consistent with theirs as possible for 
comparison purposes.  
In terms of my process for choosing the 129 school districts and the 8,462 total 
attendance zones within these districts that I used in my analysis, I first identify the 151 largest 
school districts in the United States by enrollment. It is necessary to choose large, heavily 
populated school districts to make the Thiessen polygon method work properly. For this method, 
I need census blocks containing the income data to be as small as possible in order to avoid 
splitting census blocks across actual and hypothetical borders wherever possible and in order to 
produce substantively different results between the actual and hypothetical zones. Census blocks 
are smallest in densely-populated urban areas, and so it is necessary to rely on the large, heavily-
populated school districts located in such areas for my analysis. 17 of the 151 largest school 
districts do not report their school attendance boundaries, so these districts must be excluded 
from the analysis (Phan 2015). Two of the 151 largest school districts, St. Lucie Public Schools 
in Florida and Garland Independent School District in Texas, have either district-wide school 
choice policies or open enrollment policies that render attendance zones irrelevant, so they are 
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excluded from analysis as well (Phan 2015; Garland Independent School District 2017). One of 
the 151 largest school districts, Sweetwater Union District in California, consists exclusively of 
high schools, and so this district also must be excluded due to my focus on first grade attendance 
zones (Phan 2015). Lastly, Boston Public Schools in Massachusetts and Lee County Public 
Schools in Florida must be excluded because they do not have one school zone drawn for each 
school; instead, children are zoned for multiple schools and parents must choose which school 
they prefer for their children. As an example, Boston’s school district is pictured in Figure 3. 
Each purple point represents an elementary school and the red lines represent attendance zones. 
Note that there are multiple elementary schools housed within each school attendance zone. 
Because each school does not have its own attendance zone, comparing the Thiessen attendance 
zones for those schools to their actual attendance zones would be an apples-to-oranges 
comparison. Therefore, these districts should not be included with the other school districts in 
my analysis.  
Figure 3. Boston City Public Schools  
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  After these 23 school district exclusions, 129 school districts of the initial 151 remain 
for my analysis. A full list of these 129 school districts can be found in Appendix 1. Within these 
129 school districts, I exclude all schools that serve exclusively pre-kindergartners and 
kindergartners as well as schools that serve students in second grade and above, to keep my 
analysis focused on first graders. I exclude all schools that are open-enrollment because schools 
that anyone in the district can attend do not have attendance zones. I also eliminate 556 magnet 
schools and charter schools because students generally either apply to those schools or receive 
admission through a lottery system. These eliminations initially result in a total of 8,483 total 
school attendance zones, but for some unknown reason, the Thiessen polygon tool in ArcGIS 
only generated hypothetical attendance zones around 8,462 of these schools. Considering those 
21 missing schools constitute merely 0.2 percent of the sample, I feel confident that my results 
generated using the final total of 8,462 schools are still reliable. 
I rely on several data sources for my analysis. For the attendance zones, I use the 2013-
2014 school attendance boundary shapefile from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) at the primary school level (Phan 2015). I also retrieve x-y coordinates for the schools 
from the year 2013-2014 from the NCES and transform these coordinates into points in a 
shapefile using Excel and ArcGIS (Glander 2017). I obtain 29 state block-level shapefiles from 
National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS), clip these state files by the 129 
school district borders and merge these files into one “national” block-group shapefile (Manson, 
Schroeder, Van Riper, and Ruggles 2017). I then spatially join block-level income data to both 
the actual and hypothetical attendance zones to aggregate the number of households in each of 
the 16 income brackets to both types of attendance zones.   
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The American Community Survey (ACS) only produces 5-year estimates of “Household 
Income in the Past 12 Months (in 2012 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars)” at the block-group level. 
However, to minimize the problem of overlapping block groups across actual and hypothetical 
attendance zone boundaries during the spatial joining process, it is useful to allocate the block-
group income data down to the block level. Census blocks can still overlap attendance 
boundaries, but blocks are often much smaller and contain less data per unit than block groups, 
so joining block-level income data to the attendance zones rather than block-group data will 
result in less overlapping overall. Saporito (2017) already completed this data allocation process 
for his own work, and he generously allowed me to use his block-level income data for this 
thesis. For this process, Saporito (2017, 1369) generated block-level income estimates by 
determining the proportion of families in each of the 16 income brackets in each block-group. 
Then, Saporito applied these proportions to the total populations of each block nested within 
each block-group. When this block-level data is spatially joined to the attendance zones, I 
allocate blocks that cross into multiple attendance zones to one zone based on the location of the 
block’s centroid. After income data is joined in this fashion to the actual and hypothetical 
attendance zones, I export the data from ArcGIS and into STATA for the segregation 
calculations and final ttest calculations.  
One problem that arises when eliminating magnet and charter schools from my sample of 
schools is that because of the way the NCES organizes its school attendance boundary shapefile, 
the elimination of magnet and charter schools produces holes in the shapefile. This occurs 
because the NCES organizes its geospatial data such that each observation in the shapefile’s 
attribute table is a school, rather than a school attendance zone. If the shapefile had been laid out 
with each observation as a school zone, public school zones, charter zones, and magnet zones 
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would be able to overlap each other as they do in the real world, and the removal of charter and 
magnet zones would simply reveal the underlying public school zones that each area of the U.S. 
must have. However, because each observation in the shapefile is a school, each point in space is 
assigned to one school, and so the removal of magnet and charter schools from the sample results 
in holes in the shapefile. A visualization of this problem is pictured in Figure 4, using Los 
Angeles Unified School District as an example. Note the presence of holes scattered across the 
school district – these holes represent areas that constitute magnet and charter school attendance 
zones.  The presence of holes is problematic primarily for the drawing of Thiessen polygons, 
because the Thiessen polygons constructed as the hypothetical zones for the remaining public 
schools must be drawn around the arbitrary holes that exist after excluding magnet and charter 
schools.  
Figure 4. Visualization of Holes in Attendance Boundary Shapefile – Los Angeles Unified 
School District 
   
 While the presence of holes in some school district shapefiles is unfortunate, I do not 
believe that they will seriously affect my results. While 69 total school districts in the sample 
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have at least one magnet or charter school, which means all those school districts have at least 
one hole, magnet and charter schools comprise only 5 percent of all schools in 32 of those 69 
districts. Furthermore, in 45 of those 69 districts, magnet and charter schools comprise at or less 
than 10 percent of all schools in those districts. There are only 9 school districts out of 129 where 
the percentage of magnet and charter schools is greater than 20 percent. Because the vast 
majority of school districts in the sample do not have a significant number of holes as a result of 
removing charter and magnet schools, I am confident that my results will still be reliable despite 
this problem.  
Research Methods & Data: Part II 
The second part of my analysis is based on Saporito and Van Riper’s (2016) work, and I 
apply their method of studying racial segregation across schools to the topic of income 
segregation. One of Saporito and Van Riper’s (2016, 6) critiques of Richards (2014) is that her 
methodology comparing actual and Thiessen polygons does not involve any direct measurements 
of attendance zone shapes. To determine the extent to which attendance zone gerrymandering 
affects income segregation, Saporito and Van Riper (2016) assert it is necessary to first quantify 
the shapes of attendance zones using measures of shape irregularity found in the legislative 
gerrymandering literature, and then test for correlations between attendance zone shape and 
indicators of racial diversity and integration. They argue that if irregularly shaped zones are more 
likely to have racially diverse populations, this suggests that zones are gerrymandered to 
integrate students. However, if irregularly shaped zones tend to have more racially homogenous 
populations, this suggests that zones are gerrymandered to further segregate students. I can apply 
Saporito and Van Riper’s (2016) methodology to the topic of income segregation by calculating 
spatial compactness scores for each attendance zone in my sample, calculating measures of 
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income diversity within each attendance zone, and then testing for correlations between the 
spatial compactness scores and the income diversity measures. 
 I measure the irregularity of zone shapes by using two measures frequently used in the 
legislative gerrymandering literature – the Schwartzberg index and the Reock index. Each of 
these indices measure either indentation or dispersion, which are the two main spatial 
characteristics used to quantify compactness. Indentation refers to whether a zone’s perimeter is 
perfectly smooth or jagged with various concavities or protuberances. The Schwartzberg index is 
a measure of indentation, and it is calculated by comparing the perimeter of an attendance zone 
to the circumference of a hypothetical perfect circle that has the same area as the attendance zone 
(McGlone 2016). Higher values of the Schwartzberg index indicate more irregular shapes. A 
visualization of the Schwartzberg calculation using the example of Redland Elementary School 
in Miami-Dade County is included in Figure 5A, and the formula for the Schwartzberg index is 
included in Figure 5B. For each attendance zone, I calculate the radius of the hypothetical circle 
with an area equal to that of the attendance zone. Then, using this radius, I calculate the 
Schwartzberg score by dividing the perimeter of the attendance zone by the circumference of the 
hypothetical circle.  
Figure 5A. Schwartzberg Index Visualization – Redland Elementary School 
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Figure 5B. Schwartzberg Index Calculation  
 Dispersion refers to “the extent to which the area within a shape is tightly packed around 
its center or is elongated or stretched out” (Richards & Stroub 2015, 7). The Reock index is a 
measure of dispersion, and it is calculated by dividing the area of each attendance zone by the 
area of each attendance zone’s minimum bounding circle (McGlone 2016). A visualization of the 
Reock index calculation using the example of Redland Elementary School in Miami-Dade 
County is included in Figure 6A, and the formula for the Reock index is included in Figure 6B. 
Higher values of the Reock index indicate more irregular shapes. 
Figure 6A. Reock Index Visualization – Redland Elementary School 
 
1. 𝑟𝑖 =  √
𝐴𝑖
𝜋
 
2. 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑧𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 = 1 − 
1
𝑃𝑖
2𝜋𝑟𝑖
 
Ai = Area of each attendance zone, i 
ri  = Radius of the hypothetical circle with the same area as each attendance zone, i 
Pi = Perimeter of each attendance zone, i 
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Figure 6B. Reock Index Calculation  
 
My measures of income diversity are Simpson’s measures of absolute and relative 
diversity, which are the same measures used by Saporito and Van Riper (2016). The formulas for 
Simpson’s absolute and relative diversity indices are pictured in Figure 7 (Saporito and Van 
Riper 2016). When the absolute diversity index for an attendance zone equals one, the 
proportions of each income group included in the index are perfectly identical. Conversely, when 
the absolute diversity index for an attendance zone equals zero, all the households in the 
attendance zone belong to one income group. Therefore, more diverse attendance zones will 
have absolute diversity scores closer to one, and less diverse zones will have scores closer to 
zero. One drawback of this absolute measure is that it does not compare the income diversity 
levels of attendance zones with the diversity levels of their corresponding school districts, so I 
also calculate relative diversity to address this limitation. When the relative diversity index for an 
attendance zone equals one, the proportions of each income group included in the index mirror 
the socioeconomic proportions of its corresponding school district. Conversely, the relative 
diversity index for an attendance zone equals zero when all the households of an attendance zone 
belong to one income group. For these calculations, I divide the 16 income categories provided 
by the ACS into 5 income groups.   
 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖   = 1 −   
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒 𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒,   𝑖 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒′𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑒 
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Figure 7. Simpson’s Absolute and Relative Diversity Indices 
 
 
 
 
 
I opt to use these 5 groups rather than the original 16 income brackets in the diversity 
calculations because dividing each zone’s population into as many as 16 brackets results in 
smaller numbers of households per bracket. As a result, distributing the zone’s population across 
16 brackets generally makes the proportions of people in each income bracket look very equal, 
which results in unrealistically high diversity scores for all the attendance zones. For instance, 
when the diversity index is calculated with 16 income groups, the mean absolute diversity score 
across all the zones is 0.905 and the median score is 0.912. Furthermore, the extent to which 
households are equally distributed across 16 different income brackets in each attendance zone is 
not really what I am interested in quantifying – I am more interested in the extent to which low-
income, middle-income, and high-income households are distributed equally within attendance 
zones. Using all 16 categories seems to conceal variation in income diversity that could be 
happening broadly between higher-income and lower-income income brackets, so it makes sense 
to group the attendance zone households into a smaller number of income groups. 
I define the 5 income groups used for the diversity calculations as “Lowest,” “Lower-
Middle,” “Middle,” “Upper-Middle,” and “Highest,” and these income groups roughly 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑖
2
𝐾
𝑟=1
 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 1 − (0.5 ∑|𝑃𝑟𝑗 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖|
𝐾
𝑟=1
) 
pr  = proportion of people in income group r  for each attendance zone, i 
K = number of income groups included in the index 
Pr  = proportion of people in income group r  for each school district, j 
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correspond to the national household income quintiles of the bottom 20 percent, the top 20 
percent, and the 3 income quintiles in between. To construct each of these income groups, I 
allocate each of the 16 ACS “Household Income” brackets into the appropriate income group 
based on the household income limit associated with the national household income quintile for 
that income group. For example, for the “Lower-Middle” income group which seeks to 
approximate the household incomes of the second lowest national quintile, I allocate the ACS 
“Household Income” variables of “$20,000-$24,999, $25,000-$29,999, $30,000-$34,999, and 
“$35,000-$39,999” because the highest income a household could receive and still be part of the 
second lowest income quintile was $39,764 in 2012. A complete record of this allocation process 
is found below in Table 1.  
Table 1. Allocation of 16 ACS Household Income Brackets to 5 Income Groups  
Income Group 
Name. 
National Household 
Income Quintile. 
Annual Household 
Income Percentile 
Limits (2012). 
ACS “Household 
Income in the Past 
12 Months” income 
brackets used. 
Lowest Lowest Fifth 20,599 Less than $10,000; 
$10,000-$14,999; 
$15,000-$19,999 
Lower-Middle Second 39,764 $20,000-$24,999; 
$25,000-$29,999; 
$30,000-$34,999; 
$35,000-$39,999 
Middle Third 64,582 $40,000-$44,999; 
$45,000-$49,999; 
$50,000-$59,999 
Upper-Middle Fourth  104,096 $60,000-$74,999 
$75,000-$99,999 
Highest Highest Fifth    No cutoff – includes 
all income above 
$104,096 
$100,000-$124,999 
$125,000-$149,999 
$150,000-$199,999 
$200,000 or more  
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My sample for this analysis includes all public-school attendance zones from the same 
129 school districts included in Part I of my methodology, once again excluding magnet schools, 
charter schools, open-enrollment schools, and schools that do not serve first graders. This results 
in a final sample size of 8,483 attendance zones. Furthermore, I use the same school attendance 
boundary dataset and the same income data allocated to the block level as I did in Part I of my 
methodology. Block-level income data is also spatially joined to attendance zone boundaries 
using the same process as delineated in Part I of my methodology.  
Specific Hypotheses 
Earlier in this thesis I stated my general hypothesis, which is that as Saporito’s (2017) 
theory predicts, school attendance zone gerrymandering generally produces lower levels of 
income segregation across schools. Saporito (2017) believes that non-gerrymandered, perfectly 
compact attendance zones increase segregation by reinforcing the neighborhood-level 
socioeconomic homogeneity caused by residential segregation patterns. My specific hypothesis 
for Part I of my analysis is that, in accordance with Saporito’s theory, hypothetical, perfectly 
compact attendance zones generated through the Thiessen polygon method will have higher 
dissimilarity index values on average and therefore produce higher levels of segregation than the 
actual attendance zones. My specific hypothesis for Part II of my analysis is, also in accordance 
with Saporito’s theory, that more irregularly shaped attendance zones will have higher levels of 
income diversity than more compact zones.  
Results: Part I  
 The results from Part I of my research methodology are described below. The dependent 
ttest analyzing the difference between mean segregation levels produced by actual and 
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hypothetical attendance zones found that hypothetical, non-gerrymandered zones produced very 
slightly higher levels of income segregation across schools within school districts than actual 
zones. The results of this ttest can be found in Figure 4. These results demonstrate that among 
the 129 school districts, actual attendance zones had a mean segregation score of about 0.262 and 
the Thiessen attendance zones had a mean segregation score of 0.266. Even though this data 
shows school districts were on average slightly more segregated under the Thiessen attendance 
zones than under actual attendance zones, the difference between them is not statistically 
significant. Since the test results show a two-tailed p-value of 0.1270, which is greater than 0.05, 
we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the mean segregation 
scores produced by actual and hypothetical attendance zones is equal to zero (Institute for Digital 
Research and Education 2017).  
Table 2. Dependent ttest results for segregation levels produced by actual/original and 
hypothetical/Thiessen attendance zones. 
 
Depending on how we interpret Thiessen polygons, these findings can be interpreted in 
two ways. If we agree with Richards’ (2014, p. 1119) conceptualization of Thiessen polygons, 
which is that they hypothetically represent what school attendance zones would look like in the 
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complete absence of gerrymandering, these findings demonstrate that attendance zone 
gerrymandering does not “generally exacerbate segregation,” because the segregation levels 
produced by the actual and non-gerrymandered zones are not meaningfully different from each 
other. If anything, attendance zone gerrymandering slightly reduces segregation, as the mean 
segregation levels produced by Thiessen, non-gerrymandered zones are slightly higher than 
segregation levels produced by actual zones. If we agree with Saporito’s (2017) 
conceptualization of Thiessen polygons, which is that they essentially represent neighborhood 
units within districts and can be used to measure residential segregation, then non-significant 
differences in segregation between actual school attendance zones and Thiessen polygon 
neighborhood units suggest school segregation and residential segregation are essentially one 
and the same.  
 For the results of this dependent ttest to be considered fully reliable, the distribution of 
the differences in dissimilarity index values produced by actual and hypothetical zones for each 
school district should be normally distributed.  I test for normality by plotting the differences 
between the segregation levels produced by actual and hypothetical zones for each school district 
on a qnorm plot. On the qnorm plot, if the differences in segregation levels are normally 
distributed, the points on the graph will closely track the diagonal line which represents the 
values that the differences in segregation levels would take on if they were in fact perfectly 
normally distributed. We can see in Figure 8 that while the points in the middle of the line seem 
to track the line quite precisely, there are certain points at the top and bottom of the distribution 
that diverge dramatically from the line. Based on these irregularities, it is unclear from the qnorm 
plot alone whether the differences in segregation levels for each school district are normally 
distributed. Table 3 shows the results from a Skewness-Kurtosis test, which is a method of 
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testing for normality based on a null hypothesis that the differences in segregation levels are 
normally distributed. The results for this Skewness-Kurtosis test can be found in Figure 5. Since 
the p-value for this hypothesis test was 0.00, which is less than 0.05, we must reject the null that 
the differences in segregation levels are normally distributed. The fact that the differences in 
segregation levels between actual and hypothetical attendance zones for each school district do 
not appear to be normally distributed is concerning and calls the results of the ttest into question.   
Figure 8. Qnorm Plot for the Difference in Segregation Levels Between Actual / Thiessen Zones   
 
Table 3. Skewness-Kurtosis test for the Difference in Segregation Levels Between Actual / 
Thiessen Zones 
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 It is not essential for the distribution of differences between the two types of segregation 
levels to perfectly follow a normal distribution. If the sample of differences is “large enough” or 
does not deviate dramatically from a normal distribution, the results of the dependent ttest can 
still be considered reliable. However, because the extent to which the sample is “large” or 
“approximately” normal are nebulous criteria, I used a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank 
test to test the robustness of my initial dependent ttest. This test serves the same purpose and has 
the same null hypothesis as a dependent ttest but does not rely on a normality assumption 
(Ghasemi & Zahediasl 2012). The results of the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank test are 
shown in Table 4. Because the p-value of this ttest was 0.41, which is greater than 0.05, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the mean segregation levels of 
actual and hypothetical attendance zones is statistically different from zero. The consistency of 
the Wilcoxon test results with the initial dependent ttest’s results shows that the non-parametric 
nature of the data does not invalidate the initial dependent ttest’s findings   
Table 4. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for the Difference in Segregation Levels Between Actual / 
Thiessen Zones   
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 Another assumption underlying the dependent ttest is that there must be no significant 
outliers in the differences of dissimilarity index values produced by actual and hypothetical 
zones for each school district. I checked for the presence of outliers by constructing a box-and-
whisker plot of the differences in segregation levels between actual and Thiessen zones across 
the school districts. Figure 9 displays this box-and-whisker plot, and it is clear from this plot that 
there are several school districts that are outliers. In the box-and-whisker plot, the top, middle, 
and bottom lines in the blue colored box respectively represent the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentile 
values of the data, in this case the differences in segregation levels between Thiessen and actual 
zones for each school district. The top whisker of the box-and-whisker plot is referred to as the 
upper adjacent value, which is equal to the 75th percentile value plus the product of the 
interquartile range (the difference between the 75th percentile and 25th percentile values) and 1.5. 
The bottom whisker of the box-and-whisker plot is referred to as the lower adjacent value, which 
is equal to the 25th percentile value minus the product of the interquartile range and 1.5. All the 
points lying beyond the upper and lower adjacent values are considered the outliers of the data. 
As Figure 9 shows, there are 2 school district outliers below the lower adjacent value and 10 
school district outliers above the upper adjacent value on the box-and-whisker plot. To trust the 
validity of the initial dependent ttest, it is important to evaluate whether these outliers had a 
major effect on the ttest’s results.    
To once again test the robustness of the original ttest, I temporarily removed the 12 
outliers from the sample and reran the ttest to see if the new results were dramatically different 
from the initial results. The results of this new ttest with the reduced sample can be found in 
Table 5. These results show that the mean segregation values generated by the actual and 
hypothetical attendance zones have barely changed. In the new ttest, Thiessen polygon 
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attendance zones, with a mean segregation level of 0.265, produced slightly less segregation than 
the actual attendance zones, with a mean segregation level of 0.267. However, this difference is 
still not statistically significant, as the p-value for this dependent ttest is 0.064, which is greater 
than 0.05. Based on the size of this p-value, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
difference in mean segregation levels produced by actual and hypothetical zones is equal to 0. 
This new ttest shows that the outliers did not dramatically influence the outcome of the initial 
ttest, because while the mean segregation level of Thiessen attendance zones did go down after 
removing the outliers, there was still no statistically significant difference in segregation levels 
between the two types of attendance zones after removing the outliers.   
Figure 9. Box-And-Whisker Plot for the Difference in Segregation Levels Between Actual / 
Thiessen Zones   
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Table 5. Dependent ttest with Outliers Removed.  
 
 The outliers from the initial ttest are important to evaluate because as shown by Figure 9, 
they represent the few cases where the segregation levels produced by the actual and 
hypothetical attendance zones are meaningfully different from each other. The box-and-whisker 
plot in Figure 9 shows that the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values for the differences in 
segregation levels hover closely around 0. Even the upper and lower adjacent values for the 
differences in segregation levels between actual and hypothetical zones diverge from 0 by less 
than 0.05. The similarity of the segregation levels produced by actual and hypothetical zones for 
most school districts suggests that most actual school attendance zones do not differ greatly in 
shape from their Thiessen polygon counterparts. This is not an entirely surprising finding, as 
most school districts take a “neighborhood schools” approach to deciding which schools children 
will be zoned to attend. However, what is striking is that when the outlier school districts have 
meaningfully different levels of segregation between the hypothetical and actual school 
attendance zones, the Thiessen polygon attendance zones generally produce higher levels of 
segregation than the actual zones. This is illustrated by the fact that 10 of the 12 school district 
outliers have a positive rather than negative difference between Thiessen and actual attendance 
zones, which means that the segregation value produced by hypothetical, Thiessen zones must be 
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greater than the segregation value produced by the actual zones for each of those school districts. 
Furthermore, of these 10 school districts, 2 of them – Seminole School District and Wake 
County Public Schools – have implemented districtwide policies where they have explicitly 
altered their school attendance zones to create more socioeconomically integrated schools (Potter 
et. al 2016). This suggests that at least some school districts are actively redrawing their 
attendance boundaries to deviate from a strict neighborhood schools model with the goal of 
integrating public schools, and that these approaches are effective in reducing income 
segregation.  
 All in all, both the original ttest and the box-and-whisker plot demonstrate that on 
average, school districts do not have statistically significant differences in segregation produced 
by their actual attendance zones and the hypothetical, perfectly non-gerrymandered attendance 
zones that would exist if every child attended the school closest to them. However, for the outlier 
school districts that do produce more dramatically different segregation levels between actual 
and hypothetical zones, 5 times as many districts have actual attendance zones that are less 
segregated than their hypothetical Thiessen polygon zones. This suggests that deviating from 
Thiessen polygon zones, rather than attempting to conform to them, is the best way to draw 
attendance zones in order to reduce segregation. 
Results: Part II  
 The results from Part II of my research methodology are described below. As shown in 
Table 6, the correlations between absolute income diversity and the zone irregularity measures 
are very weak, with a very low negative correlation of -0.0508 for the Schwartzberg Index and a 
very low positive correlation of 0.0062 for the Reock Index. This suggests that zones with more 
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irregularly indented shapes tend to have very slightly less income diversity and that zones with 
more irregularly dispersed shapes tend to have very slightly more income diversity in absolute 
terms. However, this measure of absolute diversity is somewhat problematic because it does not 
take the diversity levels of each attendance zone’s encompassing school district into account. 
When diversity levels of school districts are factored into the calculations, the correlations 
between relative diversity and both zone irregularity measures increase. Relative diversity is 
correlated positively with both the Schwartzberg Index and the Reock Index, at 0.0942 and 
0.0502 respectively. This suggests that zones with more irregularly indented and dispersed 
shapes tend to have slightly more income diversity relative to the diversity levels of their school 
districts at large. Therefore, while the positive direction of the relative diversity and shape 
irregularity correlations lends some support to Saporito’s argument that irregularly shaped, 
gerrymandered zones are more likely to have high levels of diversity than compact zones, the 
small size of these correlations suggests further analysis is needed.  
Table 6. Correlation Coefficients for Zone Irregularity and Diversity Measures 
 Schwartzberg Index Reock Index 
Absolute Diversity -0.0508 0.0062 
Relative Diversity 0.0942 0.0502 
 
 The positive yet weak correlations I find between both diversity measures and both 
measures of zone shape irregularity could be caused by low rates of school attendance zone 
gerrymandering across the school districts in my sample. Even if there is a more strongly 
positive relationship between the irregularity of attendance zone shapes and higher levels of 
income diversity, the correlations will not pick up on this strong relationship if most attendance 
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zones are not shaped irregularly. I have already produced some evidence that attendance zones 
are not significantly gerrymandered on average, as the original dependent ttest results from Part I 
of my results illustrate that the difference in segregation levels produced by actual and 
hypothetical, perfectly compact attendance zones does not statistically significantly deviate from 
zero.  
Another way to determine the extent to which attendance zones are gerrymandered on 
average is by comparing the average compactness scores of U.S. congressional districts to the 
average compactness scores of the attendance zones in my sample (Saporito and Van Riper 
2016, 13). Unfortunately, a universally accepted cutoff for compactness scores indicating 
substantial levels of gerrymandering does not exist in the gerrymandering literature or in 
legislative gerrymandering jurisprudence, so the best way to determine whether gerrymandering 
is “high” or “low” is through relative comparisons of compactness scores. In 2012, McGlone and 
Cheetham calculated the nationwide mean Reock and Schwartzberg scores for all U.S. 
congressional districts, and they found congressional districts had an average Reock score of 
0.6271 and an average Schwartzberg score of 0.5388. They initially calculated their indices such 
that a score of zero represented maximum irregularity and a score of one represented maximum 
compactness, so I had to invert their average scores to make them comparable with the scores 
calculated in my analysis. These scores are higher than the average Reock and Schwartzberg 
scores of the school attendance zones in my sample. The attendance zones in my sample had a 
mean Reock score of 0.5771 and a mean Schwartzberg score of 0.3324. This evidence suggests 
that attendance zones are less gerrymandered in terms of dispersion and significantly less 
gerrymandered in terms of indentation than congressional districts, which lends support to the 
argument that attendance zones on average are not meaningfully gerrymandered. Therefore, the 
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low correlations depicted in Table 6 could be driven by low levels of attendance zone 
gerrymandering across the sample.  
If it is true that attendance zones tend not to be very gerrymandered on average, I can 
better understand the effect of attendance zone gerrymandering on zone income diversity levels 
by analyzing the diversity levels of the attendance zones that are outliers in terms of shape 
irregularity and directly comparing those zones to the more compact zones. For each of the shape 
irregularity measures, I assign attendance zones to different shape categories – “Very Compact,” 
“Compact,” “Average,” “Irregular,” “Very Irregular,” and “Extremely Irregular.” I calculate two 
z-scores for each attendance zone to determine how many standard deviations each attendance 
zone’s Reock and Schwartzberg scores are from the mean Reock and Schwartzberg scores of the 
entire sample. For each measure, attendance zones are considered “very compact” if their 
irregularity score is less than -1.5 standard deviations from the mean, “compact” if their 
irregularity score is between -1.5 and -0.5 standard deviations from the mean, and “average” if 
their irregularity score is between -0.5 and 0.5 standard deviations from the mean. Attendance 
zones are considered “irregular” for each measure if their irregularity score is between 0.5 and 
1.5 standard deviations from the mean, “very irregular” if their irregularity score is between 1.5 
and 2.5 standard deviations from the mean, and “extremely irregular” if their irregularity score is 
greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. There is no “extremely compact” category 
because there were only 3 attendance zones with Reock scores less than -2.5 standard deviations 
from the mean, and there were zero attendance zones with Schwartzberg scores less than -2.5 
standard deviations from the mean. I base my classification scheme on the classification scheme 
used by Saporito and Van Riper (2016, 23).  
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Tables 7A and 7B display the mean relative diversity scores for each shape category and 
for each type of shape irregularity measure. For both the Reock and Schwartzberg indices, the 
average relative income diversity scores for very irregular and extremely irregular zones were 
several percentage points larger than the average relative diversity scores of very compact and 
compact attendance zones. Very compact and compact attendances zones in terms of the Reock 
index had average relative diversity scores of 0.832 and 0.837 respectively, and the average 
relative diversity scores increased to 0.855 and 0.857 for very irregular and extremely irregular 
attendance zones. There was an even greater difference in the average relative diversity scores of 
very compact and extremely irregular zones when quantifying attendance zone shapes using the 
Schwartzberg index. In terms of the Schwartzberg index, very compact zones had an average 
relative income diversity score of 0.834 while extremely irregular zones had an average relative 
diversity score of 0.878. These tables demonstrate that for both Reock scores and Schwartzberg 
scores, attendance zones consistently become more diverse on average as attendance zone shapes 
become more irregular.  
Table 7A. Average Relative Diversity Scores for Different Attendance Zone Shapes: Reock 
Attendance Zone 
Shape 
Shape Irregularity 
Measure  
Average Relative Income 
Diversity Score for each 
shape type 
N for each shape type 
Very Compact Reock .8321353 421 
Compact Reock  .83876562 2400 
Average Reock   .83793867 3184 
Irregular Reock  .84088838 1813 
Very Irregular Reock .85535115 539 
Extremely Irregular Reock  .85670942 126 
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Table 7B. Average Relative Diversity Scores for Different Attendance Zone Shapes: 
Schwartzberg 
Attendance Zone Shape Shape Irregularity 
Measure 
Average Relative 
Income Diversity Score 
for each shape type 
N for each shape type  
Very Compact Schwartzberg .83376026 361 
Compact Schwartzberg .8384006 2467 
Average Schwartzberg .84179014 3192 
Irregular Schwartzberg .84613252 1864 
Very Irregular Schwartzberg .86401433 581 
Extremely Irregular Schwartzberg .87841052 127 
 To check for the presence of outliers and to examine the spread of the relative diversity 
data for each of the shape irregularity categories, I construct box-and-whisker plots for the 
different attendance zone shape measures and the relative diversity index. As with the box-and-
whisker plot in Part I of my results, the top, middle, and bottom lines in the blue colored boxes of 
each box plot respectively represent the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentile values of the data, in this 
case relative diversity score values. Once again, the top whisker of the box-and-whisker plot is 
referred to as the upper adjacent value, which is equal to the 75th percentile value plus the 
product of the interquartile range (the difference between the 75th percentile and 25th percentile 
values) and 1.5. The bottom whisker of the box-and-whisker plot is also referred to as the lower 
adjacent value, which is equal to the 25th percentile value minus the product of the interquartile 
range and 1.5. All the points lying beyond the upper and lower adjacent values are considered the 
outliers of the data. 
Figure 10A shows box-and-whisker plots of relative diversity scores for each of the 
different attendance zone shape categories as quantified by the Reock index. As Figure 10A 
demonstrates, while very compact, compact, average, irregular, and very irregular zones all have 
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a substantial number of zone outliers with diversity scores lying below the lower adjacent values 
of each box plot, there is only one extremely irregular zone outlier with a diversity score that lies 
below the lower adjacent value of the box plot for extremely irregular zones. This suggests that 
of all the attendance zone shapes, extremely irregular zones in terms of Reock score have the 
most consistently high levels of diversity because they have significantly fewer low diversity 
score outliers.  
Figure 10B shows box-and-whisker plots of relative diversity index values for each of the 
different attendance zone shape categories as quantified by the Schwartzberg index. There are 
roughly similar numbers of low relative diversity outliers for very compact and extremely 
irregular attendance zone shapes, but this seems to be because the lower adjacent value of the 
box plot for extremely irregular zone shapes is significantly higher than any other box plot’s 
lower adjacent value. This lower adjacent value is probably significantly larger than those of the 
other box plots because the 75th percentile value of relative diversity scores for extremely 
irregular zones is much higher and the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile values of 
relative diversity scores is lower than those of the other zone shapes. This suggests that aside 
from those low outliers, extremely irregular zones have much higher relative diversity scores 
overall that are more tightly packed around their high mean relative diversity score than any 
other zone shape.  Furthermore, all the outliers in the extremely irregular zones’ box plot have 
noticeably higher relative diversity values than the outliers in the very compact zones’ box plot.  
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Figure 10A. Box-And-Whisker Plot for Attendance Zone Shapes (Reock) and Relative Diversity 
Index 
 
Figure 10B. Box-And-Whisker Plot for Attendance Zone Shapes (Schwartzberg) and Relative 
Diversity Index 
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 In conclusion, the positive correlation between relative income diversity and both 
measures of shape irregularity, the Reock index and the Schwartzberg index, demonstrates that 
gerrymandered attendance zones tend to have higher levels of diversity. The weakness of these 
correlations could be attributed to the fact that on average, attendance zones tend not to be 
shaped irregularly. By assigning each attendance zone into “Very Compact,” “Compact,” 
“Average,” “Irregular,” “Very Irregular,” and “Extremely Irregular” categories, I can observe the 
mean levels of relative diversity for each shape type and for each measure of shape irregularity. 
The mean levels of relative diversity for extremely irregularly shaped zones were several 
percentage points higher than the mean levels of diversity for very compact zones across both the 
Reock Index and Schwartzberg Index, which confirms Saporito’s theory that irregularly shaped 
attendance zones tend to have higher levels of diversity. The box-and-whisker plot of the 
different attendance zone shapes under the Reock index suggests that extremely irregularly 
shaped zones not only have the highest mean relative diversity score, but that they are also the 
most consistently diverse because they have significantly fewer low-diversity outliers compared 
to all the other shape types. The box-and-whisker plot of the different attendance zone shapes 
under the Schwartzberg index also suggests that extremely irregularly shaped zones are the most 
consistently diverse, because the relatively high lower adjacent value of these zones’ box plot 
shows that the relative diversity scores are tightly packed around the high mean relative diversity 
score for irregular zones. Additionally, even the outliers of the extremely irregular zones still 
have higher levels of relative diversity than the outliers of all the other shape types. My findings 
that more irregularly shaped attendance zones have consistently higher levels of relative income 
diversity lend support to Saporito’s (2017) theory that attendance zone gerrymandering reduces 
income segregation across schools.  
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Implications  
 My thesis sought to contribute to the existing debate over whether school attendance zone 
gerrymandering exacerbates or mitigates income segregation across schools. My findings 
suggest that on average, most attendance zones are not currently gerrymandered to dramatically 
deviate from attendance zones that assign all children to their closest neighborhood school. 
However, my findings show that among school districts with larger differences in segregation 
levels produced by actual and hypothetical attendance zones, there are significantly more school 
districts with actual attendance zones that produce lower levels of segregation than would 
otherwise exist under Thiessen zones. Furthermore, my results demonstrate that extremely 
irregularly shaped zones have substantially higher levels of income diversity than very compact 
zones, which suggests that gerrymandered school attendance zones are more likely to foster 
socioeconomic integration rather than income segregation. All this evidence suggests that 
Saporito’s (2017) theory more accurately characterizes the relationship between school 
attendance zone gerrymandering and income segregation across schools than Richards’ (2014) 
theory.  
 My findings do not suggest that all examples of school attendance zone gerrymandering 
will necessarily have an integrative effect. Richards (2014) and Siegel-Hawley (2013) make 
important contributions to the literature by pointing out specific examples of gerrymandered 
attendance zones that clearly do more to segregate than integrate students. In my own sample, 
the existence of several irregularly shaped zone outliers with unexpectedly low levels of income 
diversity suggests that some individual zones are indeed gerrymandered to increase 
socioeconomic homogeneity in schools. However, my results do suggest that on average, 
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drawing irregularly shaped, gerrymandered attendance zones seem to reduce segregation and 
promote economic integration.  
Consequently, I would caution against some of Richards’ policy recommendations, which 
include calling upon state and federal agencies to implement policies that establish a certain 
minimum standard of compactness for all attendance zones and implementing an oversight body 
to conduct investigations of districts that do not meet these compactness requirements (Richards 
and Stroub 2015, 27). In making these recommendations, Richards is clearly operating under the 
assumption that all attendance zone gerrymandering is automatically discriminatory and 
segregative. Saporito takes issue with both this assumption and these wide-reaching policy 
recommendations in one of his papers (Saporito 2017, 1350). My own analysis seems to suggest 
that Saporito (2017) is justified in his concern about Richards’ (2014; 2015) policy prescriptions. 
It seems that if more school districts made an active attempt to draw irregular school attendance 
zones that cross-cut residentially segregated neighborhoods, school districts could build more 
socioeconomically diverse schools to better serve our nation’s low-income children.  
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Appendix 1: List of School Districts Analyzed, in order of enrollment size 
1. NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
2. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED 
3. CITY OF CHICAGO SD 299 
4. DADE 
5. CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
6. BROWARD 
7. HOUSTON ISD 
8. HILLSBOROUGH 
9. ORANGE 
10. HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
11. FAIRFAX CO PBLC SCHS 
12. PALM BEACH 
13. GWINNETT COUNTY 
14. DALLAS ISD 
15. WAKE COUNTY SCHOOLS 
16. MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
17. SHELBY CO 
18. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS 
19. PHILADELPHIA CITY SD 
20. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED 
21. DUVAL 
22. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
23. CYPRESS-FAIRBANKS ISD 
24. COBB COUNTY 
25. BALTIMORE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
26. PINELLAS 
27. JEFFERSON COUNTY 
28. DEKALB COUNTY 
29. POLK 
30. FULTON COUNTY 
31. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
32. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 IN THE COUNTY OF DENVER AND STATE OF C 
33. PRINCE WILLIAM CO PBLC SCHS 
34. AUSTIN ISD 
35. BALTIMORE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
36. DAVIDSON COUNTY 
37. MILWAUKEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
38. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
39. FRESNO UNIFIED 
40. GUILFORD COUNTY SCHOOLS 
41. BREVARD 
42. FORT BEND ISD 
43. LOUDOUN CO PBLC SCHS 
44. VA BEACH CITY PBLC SCHS 
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45. DAVIS DISTRICT 
46. GRANITE DISTRICT 
47. NORTH EAST ISD 
48. PASCO 
49. ALDINE ISD 
50. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. RE 1 
51. WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
52. SEMINOLE 
53. ARLINGTON ISD 
54. MESA UNIFIED DISTRICT 
55. ELK GROVE UNIFIED 
56. EL PASO ISD 
57. VOLUSIA 
58. KNOX COUNTY 
59. CHESTERFIELD CO PBLC SCHS 
60. OSCEOLA 
61. SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED 
62. SANTA ANA UNIFIED 
63. CONROE ISD 
64. PLANO ISD 
65. PASADENA ISD 
66. SAN ANTONIO ISD 
67. CAPISTRANO UNIFIED 
68. SAN BERNARDINO CITY UNIFIED 
69. WINSTON SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY SCHOOLS 
70. JORDAN DISTRICT 
71. HOWARD COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
72. LEWISVILLE ISD 
73. CLAYTON COUNTY 
74. CUMBERLAND COUNTY SCHOOLS 
75. OMAHA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
76. HENRICO CO PBLC SCHS 
77. SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
78. COLUMBUS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
79. ATLANTA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
80. BROWNSVILLE ISD 
81. TUCSON UNIFIED DISTRICT 
82. SAN JUAN UNIFIED 
83. KLEIN ISD 
84. ANCHORAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
85. PORTLAND SD 1J 
86. OAKLAND UNIFIED 
87. SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED 
88. GARDEN GROVE UNIFIED 
89. MANATEE 
90. JEFFERSON PARISH 
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91. FRISCO ISD 
92. CHARLESTON 01 
93. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
94. SOCORRO ISD 
95. COLLIER 
96. UNITED ISD 
97. HAMILTON COUNTY 
98. YSLETA ISD 
99. RIVERSIDE UNIFIED 
100. ADAMS 12 FIVE STAR SCHOOLS 
101. MARION 
102. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH 
103. LAKE 
104. SARASOTA 
105. CHANDLER UNIFIED DISTRICT #80 
106. UNION COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
107. HORRY 01 
108. CADDO PARISH 
109. OKLAHOMA CITY 
110. AURORA JOINT DISTRICT NO. 28 OF THE COUNTIES OF ADAMS AND A 
111. CLOVIS UNIFIED 
112. ESCAMBIA 
113. HENRY COUNTY 
114. FORSYTH COUNTY 
115. FREDERICK COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
116. SALEM-KEIZER SD 24J 
117. SD U-46 
118. TULSA 
119. FAYETTE COUNTY 
120. CLEAR CREEK ISD 
121. FONTANA UNIFIED 
122. MESQUITE ISD 
123. CHEROKEE COUNTY 
124. CHESAPEAKE CITY PBLC SCHS 
125. BEAVERTON SD 48J 
126. STOCKTON UNIFIED 
127. CORPUS CHRISTI ISD 
128. RICHARDSON ISD 
129. ANOKA-HENNEPIN PUBLIC SCHOOL DIST. 
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